This article dealing with the loyalty question in modern Turkey purports to study, from this point of view, the relations between nationalism, Islamism, and globalisation since the foundation of the Republic in 1923.
“Loyalty in post-national state” is a fairly new subject of discussion. After a brief glance at some processes and general concepts in a first part, Baskin Oran is questioning the forthcoming evolution of Turkish society and politics within the encompassing framework of globalization.
Will Turkey go back to Islam under the dress of hard-core islamism ? Will Turkey know a territorial explosion because of Kurdish nationalism ?
V - TURKEY AFTER FEBRUARY 1997: QUO VADIS ?
Political Developments
At the beginning of 1997 Kemalism began a counter-attack the keynote of which was given by the Military.
The National Security Council (55), in a “28 February 1997 Declaration” criticised very severely the anti secular atmosphere and asked the (Refah) government to take appropriate measures to stop the proliferation of Islamist cadres, and to apply the Kemalist laws (for the latter, see Section II).
After this document (that Professor Erbakan had to sign as prime minister the Military gave a series of briefings to the press in which religious fundamentalism was declared the most dangerous enemy (56).
In this funny situation, something even funnier happened: The coalition unexpectedly fell at the end of June 1997. That was simply because Mrs. Çiller had now wanted to become prime minister as stipulated in the coalition protocol and Mr. Erbakan had resigned to switch places with her. But things had not turned out as the two had planned. This was an occasion for Mr. Mesut Yilmaz of conservative ANAP to found a new coalition with two other parties (Social democrat DSP of Mr. Ecevit and conservative DTP of Mr. Cindoruk), with outside support from Mr. Baykal’s CHP, the old party of Atatürk.
The new government enjoying strong backing of the Kemalists and of the Military started a series of anti-fundamentalist measures. It began to actively investigate the Islamists, inspect student dormitories of Islamic orders, transfer elsewhere Islamists holding key government posts such as at the Ministry of National Education, question the Islamist tendencies of some provincial and district governors, and it finally tried to get under control religious foundations the number of which reached 800 by 1997.
Most important of all, however, was the closure of the first three years of Imam-Hatip schools by extending compulsory primary education from 5 to 8 years (57) as demanded by the Military in the 28 February Declaration.
In the mean time, in May 1997, the Prosecutor General of the Republic had filed a lawsuit to the Constitutional (Supreme) Court for the closure of Refah, citing “anti-constitutional anti-secular actions” of the party. It was the first time in Turkey (and perhaps in the world also) that this was done about a political party in power.
Refah was closed by the Constitutional Court in January 1998 for its anti-secular anti-constitutional Islamic discourse and actions.
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It would be very misleading, however, to see these developments simply as a prodding of the Turkish Military.
Firstly, it was widely accepted that the Military “had had to make the Parliament work” because a great majority of the parliamentarians were most reluctant to take any action against the Islamists. This was either because they were afraid of loosing votes, or/and more probably, they had been involved themselves in some kind of corruption one way or the other and were afraid of being deprived of their legislative immunities by Refah’s parliamentarians votes. There was a large consensus in the public opinion about the Military having had to fill in the vacuum created by the Parliament.
Secondly, reaction created by Islamists caused a true renaissance of Kemalist activity practically dormant until around 1995. A great majority of educated people in large cities started to wear Atatürk badges, stick Kemalist slogans to their cars, organize large public demonstrations, and work in Kemalist associations. They even went to fill, simply as a symbolic reaction to the Islamists, a 5000-seat gym in a faraway suburb of the capital to listen to the Presidential Symphony Orchestra playing Beethoven.
Kemalists were not the only category that showed a strong reaction to the Islamist practices, either. TÜSIAD published a very important report in January 1997, i.e. one month before the Military, called “Turkey’s Democratisation Perspectives” demanding radical liberal reforms, in which the closing of the first three years of Imam-Hatip schools were underlined in particular (see below the subheading “The Big Bourgeoisie”).
A word about why the Military who, exactly twenty-four years earlier (February 1973) had declared communism enemy no. 1 of the nation and who openly promoted Islam after the coup of 1980, had now turned their arrows against the Islamists:
By 1997 there was no communist threat from “Russia” (this was most important for the Military), no leftist movement to speak of, no anarchy in the streets.
On the other hand, there now was a very strong Islamist movement that openly challenged the sine qua non concepts of the Turkish Military:
Firstly, the Islamists were challenging both the cherished concept the Military had always considered themselves responsible of, “The Turkish Nation”, and also the concept constituting the most important legacy of Atatürk: Westernization. This constituted a double threat for the Military : Because the FSL can always be one and only, it was either the Military’s FSL or the Islamists’ FSL. On the other hand, the Turkish Military’s position as the foremost defender of these two concepts had always been the very basis of their superiority in Turkish politics and they’d have lost it if the Islamists won.
Secondly, the Islamists were challenging the most important concept of all the Military of the world: Discipline. When one of the officers accused of religious fundamentalism and eventually discharged from the Armed Forces declared: “I’ll obey my own Imam [religious leader] and not my commander!” it was too much for the Military who were already disturbed by the fact that the main strength of the Islamists came from the support given to them by the 1980 junta.
Religion, Nationalism, and Globalisation
Now in Turkey three rivals seem to challenge Kemalism and its FSL (“Turkish Nation”): The nationalist Kurds, The Islamists, and Globalisation.
1) The nationalist Kurds :
Nationalist Kurds, mainly represented by the PKK, challenge not only Kemalism but the “indivisibility of Turkey” founded by the latter, as well.
If taken strictly from the point of view of our subject matter here, this rival is the least important for a number of reasons
:
Firstly, PKK’s FSL is “Kurdish Nation in an Independent Kurdistan”, while Kemalism’s FSL is “Turkish Nation in an Independent Turkey”. Both feel loyalty to the Nation and to the Independent National State. Thus, their FSLs are conceptually the same. From this angle, the contesting Kurds are, in a way, staunch Kurdish “Kemalists”.
Secondly, not all the Kurds contesting Kemalism are challenging the indivisibility of Turkey, because not all of them want independence. Even the PKK itself is very ambiguous in this matter.
Thirdly, not all the Turkish nationals of Kurdish descent (approximately 20% of the population) are Kurdish nationalists. Some of them are assimilated as witnessed by the fact that Ziya Gökalp, the “father” of Turkish nationalism in the 1920s, as well as three of nine Presidents of the Republic and also Mr. Hikmet Çetin, the incumbent President of the Parliament are of Kurdish origin. Many Kurds prefer to stay as Turkish nationals of “respected Kurdish descent” than become nationals of a probably landlocked, tribal, and autocratic Kurdistan.
Fourthly, globalisation is the main concept responsible for the highlighted position of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey today (relation between communications and nationalism is only too well known). But, on the other hand, the two-edged nature of this concept is also fully present here : in an age of globalisation where materialistic values of the West flood every corner of the globe, many Kurds, if provided with a decent job and respect for their sub-identity, would very probably act in compliance with the third point above. While all the Turkish parents try the impossible to send their kids to English-medium schools, Kurdish parents would hardly send theirs to Kurdish-medium schools (58).
On the other hand, Kurdish nationalism of the PKK is provoking Turkish nationalism. Since a few years people began to paste Turkish flags on their cars, sing the national anthem at the opening of regular football games (custom was to sing it at international games only), make wild demonstrations while saying good-bye to enlisted youngsters, etc. But I should add that this kind of ultra-nationalism usually takes place not among the Kemalists but among the unconscious masses further provoked by the pro-fascists professing the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis and calling themselves “nationalists” (“Milliyetçi”).
2) The Islamists:
From the point of view of our subject matter here, Islamic challenge is much more important practically, and to an even greater degree, theoretically.
Practically, because the highest voting rate (approx. 22%) is scored by an Islamist party and the Kemalist State is very much influenced by Islamist cadres placed in important administrative levels. What’s more, these cadres are continuously fed every year both by thousands of Imam-Hatip graduates and by immense money flowing in from religious foundations financed by the “Anatolian capital” mentioned above, and very possibly, Saudi and Iranian banks also.
Theoretically, because Islam’s FSL is the very opposite of that of Kemalism and also because, in a country like Turkey (according to statistics Turkey is 98 per cent Muslim, mostly Sunnis), it has the potential to impose severe restrictions on the freedom of choice of non-Muslims and non-believers on one side, and of non-Sunni Muslims (Alevis), on the other.
These two categories are those who, when asked their primary identity, answer “I’m a Muslim”, in sharp contradiction with saying “I’m a Turk”. Their cars’ rear window stickers read (in heavy Ottoman Turkish): “Hakimiyet Allahindir” (Sovereignty Belongs to Allah), against those of the Kemalists’ (in “pure Turkish” developed in the 1930s by the above-mentioned Turkish Linguistic Society): “Egemenlik Ulusundur” (Sovereignty Belongs to the Nation").59
This Islamist challenge can be studied in two distinct groups: Those who vote for Islamic parties like Refah, and those who lead and finance Islamic parties like Refah.
a) Refah’s Voters
Aside from a small core of Islamic sect (“tarikat”) members, this first category is mainly composed of sympathisers who had traditionally voted for centre-right conservative parties before 1970s.
Although these votes form the highest percentage cast in the last elections (Dec. 95), they are far from reflecting the “Islamic tendency” of modern Turkey.
For one reason, they form less than 22 per cent of the total electorate, as already stated above. Secondly and much more importantly, these are “protest” votes rather than “Islamist” votes as suggested both by their social class origin and their geographical distribution.
As a matter of fact, these votes mainly come from those strata who have never been able to go beyond the semi feudal - semi capitalist relations : Lower-middle class masses or at most small shopkeepers (60). These are barely able to make a living and their situation has been getting worse during the last twenty years because of the process of globalisation.
As its economic situation is worsened by transition from national capitalism to international capitalism and as it strongly resents the new culture (fashion shows, erotic movies on TV, etc.), this strata feels even more threatened by the coming MP. Therefore, it is extremely receptive to slogans like “Just Order” and, devoid of political consciousness, it sees its salvation in going back to the “good old days”. So, to feel secure, it votes for Refah and similar political parties that use a heavy Islamic discourse in remembrance of the past.
Although one has to take into account also the effect of world-wide “Islamic Revivalism”, the fact that these votes have more of a “protest” content than an “Islamic” one is also demonstrated by the fact that they come from two distinct social-geographical locations. One of these is south-eastern Turkey where the Kurdish population react to the banning of a series of Kurdish political parties ; the other is the suburban slums of giant urban conglomerates where people react to a three-digit inflation and to the showy extravagant wealth of a “happy minority”
b) Refah’s Elite
This elite comes from the Islamic sects ideologically, and from what has been called above “Anatolian capital” social-economically. Superposition (ÇAKIŞMAK) of these two categories forms one of the most important characteristics of Refah.
The “Anatolian Tigers” now represented by MÜSIAD (the story of which has already been shortly told above under the subtitle “The Rise of the Islamist Capital”), declared themselves for national capitalism and against international capitalism (European Community, etc.) until the 80s. This was when this capital was subjugated by the big capital of Istanbul. But after this date, thanks to Özal’s economic policies and to “intermestic” relations rendered possible by globalisation, it came to articulate with international capitalism (61) and had since then no objection to it on the economic realm. On the contrary, MÜSIAD came to review its relations accordingly. For instance, although anti-Semitism has always been one of the cornerstones of Islamism in Turkey, MÜSIAD members were present at the reception given in May 1998 by the Israeli Consul General in Istanbul for the 50th anniversary of Israel’s foundation. This was simply because Israel became a very important economic and strategic partner of Turkey since the past year.
But it’s a striking fact that MÜSIAD’s Islamist ideology did in no way follow this very important change. On the contrary, it became even more active in supporting Refah and in efficiently financing institutions and foundations propagating the idea that sovereignty belongs to God in contradiction with The Nation.
In this context, one can presume that Islam has for “Anatolian Tigers” a social, economic, and political significance and rationale that far exceed the conditioning of the religious atmosphere they had absorbed in their small native agrarian towns:
Firstly, Islam enables MÜSIAD to influence the State, itself also very much influenced by the religious discourse and atmosphere as described above.
Secondly and more importantly, Islam enables MÜSIAD to draw the support of the masses (62) in its fight against a much stronger TÜSIAD. In other words, for MÜSIAD, Islam is rather an instrument of fighting a class struggle than a way of believing.
Thirdly, Islamic ideology can serve as an “untouchable” rationalisation in different occasions. For example, a holding company from Konya (a province known for being one of the strongholds of the Islamists) that had bought a hotel in Cappadocia (central Turkey) during privatisation of the official TURBAN (Tourism Bank) returned it to the seller shortly after the purchase on grounds that the hotel was built on a Greek Orthodox cemetery. The company could not possibly afford “the sacrilege of serving alcoholic drinks on such a site” (63).
What can be said about the future of this “Anatolian capital”?
Theory and practice tell us that this Islamic capital will “become bourgeois” in a generation or two. Newspapers report that Professor Erbakan’s teenage son, who wears but Versace ties and socks, drives a Mercedes CL 500 Coupe, and when he bumps into someone’s vehicle his bodyguard quickly replaces him at the wheel before the police arrives because he hasn’t got a driving license yet.
There seems to be even less doubt that at least some of the Islamists will be disappointed with the Islamist capital. Professor Erbakan, once in power, did exactly the contrary of what he professed while in opposition. He extended the mandate of the Operation Provide Comfort-264, signed a new military training agreement with Israel, declared Turkey ready for the European Union, stuck to high interest rates policy, and sent his right arm to the USA to be recognised as a moderate party.
But much more importantly, one sincere Islamist said to me: “They are having fun like capitalists. They have become normal capitalists. We would have expected them to be Muslim capitalists”. One of my students who wears the turban and doesn’t shake hands with men was mad at her father because when she wanted to change her car, he bought for her a Turkish-made new Fiat instead of a Japanese car as he had originally promised.
Finally, I would like to point out to one very striking development: Fazilet (Virtue) Party that quickly replaced Refah had already declared that the slogan “Just Order” would no longer be used because it was “misunderstood”. Reminded by the interviewer that Prof. Erbakan had said that the State would become the co-owner of private factories under “Just Order”, Mr. Recai Kutan the leader of the Party laughed and replied: “It was intellectual exercise. Anyway, Prof. Erbakan himself did nothing to put it into practice when he was Prime Minister” (65).
3) Globalisation :
This phenomenon is slowly but steadily destroying, as it does for every national state, the foundations of Kemalism. Economically, statism (state ownership leading the economy) has passed away since 1980 and with it, of course, is passing away all the mentality of nationalism. The “Domestic Products Week” celebrated in primary schools since 1930s to promote domestic products against imports is still being celebrated but it’s now a kind of joke because the kids, instead of bringing to school traditional local food (like hazelnuts, raisins, figs, etc.) to eat together, they now bring imported Chiquita bananas and kiwis.
In Turkey, there are two groups that take the greatest profit out of the new order of things created by globalisation:
a) The “Corner-turners” (66), and the Mafia:
This category, that barely existed before Turkey entered the era of globalisation, became the “rule” today. Today, money and private interest have taken the lead among the “rising values” of the youngsters (“The Özal Youth”) especially, and the Mafia has conquered key positions in the State apparatus as the undeclared war between the State and the PKK made south eastern Turkey a drug traffic paradise.(67)
On the other hand, this category can of course be ignored from the point of view of our study here because, as has already been stated in the Introduction (see subheading “Qualifications of the FSL”), it’s only natural that at any time in history personal interest had been a major incentive for everybody. But it’s also a fact that no cohesion ideology ever pointed at it as the FSL. I mentioned it here to underline the fact that chaos brought by globalisation favoured this category particularly, as it always happens in times of transition.
b) The big bourgeoisie
The outgoing mode of production (national capitalism) and its cohesion ideology (nationalism) have succeeded to build a national bourgeoisie and this bourgeoisie is now looking forward to articulate with international capitalism (globalisation) to be able to compete on the domestic and global market. It is mainly represented by TÜSIAD and is definitely in favour of entering the European Union and of everything that goes with it.
In this respect, a further inquiry into TUSIAD is revealing.
This important body was very conservative until 1990s. It had even been the main force behind the fall of the social democrats in 1979 by publishing in large selling newspapers of the day full-page criticisms. It had also strongly backed up, during the period 1970-90, anti communist and pro-fascist forces definitely imbued with an Islamic ideology.
This very same TÜSIAD published in January 1997, as already stated above, an extremely important document entitled “Turkey’s Democratisation Perspectives” in which it declared to be definitely in favour of modern human rights and freedoms professed by the West. The Report asked, among others, that the ban on Kurdish language be lifted, Imam-Hatip schools be limited, and lessons of religion be no more compulsory (68).
The document was severely criticised by MÜSIAD as “unnecessary and untimely” (69) .
The Report also drew some criticism from right-wing circles of the big business. But the fact that TÜSIAD had this Report written by a constitutional law professor known to be a leftist (Dr. Bülent Tanör) points out to a striking fact : the big bourgeoisie, much like the Military, now seems to have saved itself from the paranoia of communism. But at the same time, this shows that it has decided that adopting the superstructure of globalisation (human and minority rights, and democracy) is now the prerequisite for its articulation with international capitalism, the infrastructure of globalisation.
It’s also very important to note that the president of the all-important TISK (Employers’ Union of Turkey) Mr. Refik Baydur is today one of the foregoing opponents of Islamic movement in Turkey, while the same TISK had been, in 1982, directly responsible for the introduction of compulsory courses of religion in the Constitution (see footnote 35).
VI - CONCLUSION: IS TURKEY GOING ISLAMIST ?
Turkey had passed from Phase 1 to Phase 2 by the revolution from above of Kemalism, without successfully completing her “nation building” process. Now that she suddenly enters Phase 3 (globalisation), what’s going to happen? Is she, as suggested by some people, going to make a “backwards transition” and espouse the old Islamic ideology she had some 75 years ago, or is she going to make a “forward transition” to globalisation ?
This question can be answered in the light of political, social, and economic facts of the country:
1) The Position of the Ruling Strata :
Firstly, those who still hold the reins of the State apparatus (civil and especially military bureaucracy) are very much against Islam as an ideology leading our lives because they are on the very opposite ideological front (nationalism).
Secondly, the stronger component of the ruling class (the big bourgeoisie) is very much against Islamic order and the weaker component (Anatolian capital) seems to pay only lip service to Islam while quickly articulating with the infrastructure of globalisation. This is because the outgoing MP (national capitalism) has been beneficial to both and both look forward to make a transition to the next MP (international capitalism).
2) The Position of the Masses :
The fact that Refah’s votes are not “religious votes” but “reaction votes” is demonstrated not only by the fact that they mainly come from the Southeast (reaction of the Kurds) and from the slum areas (reaction of the impoverished), but also because of the fact that the “ignorant” Refah voter is more liberal than the “learned” Imam-Hatip students (see footnote 43).
Therefore, not all those who vote for Islam (20+ %) really want a backward transition; they only show, in an incomplete model of nation building, their reaction to globalisation in a religious form.
In other words, the answer to the above question is “no”. The real challenger of Kemalism is not Islam, but Globalisation.
Of course, this strong reaction in religious form will continue for quite a while yet, at least as long as the actual income distribution will not improve somehow. On the contrary, it could become much stronger if the Islamists were not matched in two fields: Education and finance.
But from there, one should not try to deduce that Turkey could end up like Pakistan and Iran, not only because Turkey became a prominent part of the Western system of evolution by passing from Phase 1 to Phase 2; but also because Pakistan and Iran had never really gone beyond Phase 1.
The end
Endnotes :
55 A constitutional body, in theory “advisory” but in fact very influential because of heavy influence of the Military. It is composed of top military commanders and of some cabinet members.
56 This was put into written form in the so-called “National Policy Document” published by the National Security Council in October 1997. The Document declared struggle with “secessionist and religious fundamentalist movements of equal and primary priority” and it also denounced the “Racist Mafia” and said “local and cultural particularities could be developed on condition that they did not interfere with the public sphere”. (See Hürriyet, 4 November 1997).
57 This was the most important blow to the Islamists, because Islamist cadres were carefully raised in these schools having incomparably better schooling conditions than any other state school (small classes, computerised teaching, developed language & science laboratories, etc.) thanks of course, to very generous private (Islamist) donations. “First three years” were of crucial importance, because sending a child of 14 years-old to a school giving Islamic/Islamist education is not as easy (and instrumental) as sending him there at 11. This very fear was openly voiced by the Refah leaders when they declared that “a 14 year-old student may no longer want to go to a Imam-Hatip” (Cumhuriyet, 11 August 1997). This is why the Islamists kept on demonstrating in the streets following the Friday prayer.
58 Just like the parents in Central Asia who sent their kids to Russian-medium schools in the USSR. On this matter, see my “Thoughts on the State and the Kurdish Identity in Turkey” in Ole Hoiris and Sefa Martin Yürükel (eds.), Contrasts and Solutions in the Middle East, Aarhus University Press, 1997, p.489-499.
59 I find it very significant to underline that in this “fight” between the car stickers two very different languages are used, although both slogans are written in Turkish and in Latin alphabet.
60 In Turkey, this joke is very revealing in this context: “Brave Grocery of the Corner vs. the Supermarket”.
61 For example, a local Anatolian company in Çorum (a so-far insignificant central Anatolian town) is now manufacturing army trousers for the German army. This evolution was made possible by an allocation of public funds in a very advantageous way to the Anatolian businessmen. As a matter of fact, in the period 1990-96, 54.5% of the public resources were allocated to Anatolian “small and medium business” mainly producing cotton thread, while the regions where the great majority of the population lives (like Istanbul, a city of some 10 million people) received 46.6%. These figures were taken from a research by Mustafa Sönmez published in the Forum magazine (July 1997) of TOBB (Union of Chambers and Stock Markets of Turkey), quoted in Ali Bayramoglu, Yeni Yüzyil, 2 September 1997.
62 The very choice of the acronym (DIKKAT) MÜSIAD seems, from to have been done carefully is revealing in this context: Although the “M” represents “Müstakil” (independent), everybody interprets it as “Müslüman” (Muslim).
63 Sabah, 13 July 1998. It was reported that the company had asked for a delay of 4 months to make the payment, at the end of which it disclosed its intention and the “reason” for it. The Bank’s officials said that the company already knew about the old cemetery but wanted to return it because of the dramatic falls in bed prices lately. I should add that the last Greek Orthodox quit Cappadocia in 1923 at the time of the compulsory exchange of populations between Turkey and Greece.
64 It will be remembered that this Operation was started in 1991 under the leadership of the USA to keep Iraqi Kurds in a safe-haven, out of the reach of Saddam. Refah, when it was in opposition, had always been very critical of this force of “imperialist America”.
65 Interview by Fatih Çekirge, Sabah, 11 July 1998.
66 “The Corner-turners” are those who were suddenly enriched through extralegal and/or illegal means consciously created during the Özal era. “To turn the corner” (to have it made) has a definitely negative connotation in today’s Turkish.
67 The investigations about the Susurluk scandal (November 1996), that made public suddenly the open secret of Mafia-State relations in Turkey, led nowhere as of today because too many top-rank statesmen, military and civil bureaucrats, and politicians were deeply involved in corruption. (The scandal was about the outcome of a shocking traffic accident. Three corpses and a wounded person were found in a recently smashed car. Apart from the dead body of a young fashion model, the corpses belonged to a top-rank Fascist Mafia member regularly “used” by “counter guerrilla” organisations of the State by providing him with various firearms, and several special passports and IDs, and to a top-rank police chief. The wounded person was a very famous Kurdish feudal lord co-operating with the State against the PKK as “Chief Village Protector”, an incumbent parliamentarian in spite of being a long-time convicted murderer of several gendarmes).
68 The Report went even so far as to suggest a reform that the Military consider as their “bête noire”: Attachment of the General Staff, as is the case in Western democracies, to the Ministry of Defense (it’s now attached to the Prime Ministry directly).
69 Yeni Yüzyil, 25 January 1997.
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