This article dealing with the loyalty question in modern Turkey purports to study, from this point of view, the relations between nationalism, Islamism, and globalisation since the foundation of the Republic in 1923.
« Loyalty in post-national state » is a fairly new subject of discussion. After a brief glance at some processes and general concepts in a first part, Baskin Oran is proposing a transversal analysis of the Republican Turkey emerging from the old and feudal institutions of the Ottoman Empire.
II - TURKEY : FROM « GOD » TO « NATION » UNDER KEMALISM
Republican Turkey, the direct successor of the semi-theocratic (17) Ottoman Empire and still the only secular country in the Muslim world, made a transition from Phase 1 to Phase 2 under the « revolution from above » of Mustafa Kemal, to whom Turkish Grand National Assembly (GNA) gave the family name of « Atatürk » in 1934.
The Turkish war of independence started in 1919 and ended in August 1922 with the defeat (The « Mikrasiatiki Katastrofi ») of the invading Greek armies backed by the Great Powers.
In fact, the nationalists under M. Kemal had fought the war on a second -and, more difficult- front also : Against the armies of the Sultan-Caliph as well as against the insurgencies provoked all over Anatolia by Istanbul (18).
Transition from « God » to « Turkish Nation » was started even before the war was over (19).
This process was an integral part of the first prototype of an « underdeveloped country nationalism »20 during which the Westernised elite (mostly Military) strove to build, in a basically feudal society, a « nation » by creating the atmosphere of the Enlightenment of the 17th Century.
This transition concerning the FSL was accomplished by a « revolution from above » that aimed, first, to destroy the foundations of the umma order, and second, to erect the new foundations of a nation-state. This process can be summarised in the following chronology :
23 April 1920 : Opening of the GNA (Great National Assembly)
20 January 1921 : Art. 1 of the first Constitution declared : « The sovereignty unconditionally belongs to the nation.(21) The system of administration is based on the people administering their own destiny. »
1 November 1922 : Abolition of the Sultanate by « decision » of the GNA.(22)
29 October 1923 : Declaration of the Republic.(23)
3 March 1924 : a) Abolition of the Caliphate, b) Abolition of the Ministry of Shariah and of Religious Foundations and its replacement by the Directorate of Religious Affairs, c) Attachment of all schools to the Ministry of National Education. Religious schools (medresseh) were closed.(24)
8 April 1924 : Abolition of religious courts.(25)
30 November 1925 : Closure of tekkes (dervish lodges).(26)
17 February 1926 : Adoption of Swiss Civil Code.
1 July 1926 : Adoption of Italian Penal Code. (27)
1 November 1928 : Abolition of the Arabic alphabet and adoption of Latin alphabet.(28)
10 April 1928 : The provision of the 1924 (second) Constitution that declared « The religion of Turkey is Islam » was deleted.
23 April 1930 : Foundation of the « Committee for the Study of Turkish History » (renamed in 1935 : « Turkish Historical Society »).
10 May 1931 : « Secularism » was included in the program of the Republican People’s Party as one of the « Six Arrows » (principles).(29)
12 July 1932 : Foundation of the « Society for the Study of Turkish Language » (renamed in 1936 : « Turkish Linguistic Society »). (30)
February 1933 : Ezan (call to prayer) was started to be sang in Turkish instead of in Arabic.
5 February 1937 : « Secularism » entered in the Constitution (art.2) along with the other « arrows ».
Religious Education :
The Republic was particularly anti-clerical in the field of religious education.
The number of students at the Theology Seminar (284 in 1925) fell to 167 in 1926 and to 20 in 1933. The Seminar was closed in 1941 because « there were no more students ». There were 29 « Imam-Hatip » (prayer leader-preacher) schools in 1924. This number was reduced to 2 in 1930 and the same year these schools were closed.(31)
Religious courses were excluded from the curriculum in the 1930s in city schools and in 1939 in village schools. Some mosques were closed and made storehouses.(32)
III - TURKEY IN THE POST KEMALIST PERIOD : REACTION
These reforms of superstructure, transforming the basically feudal infrastructure of Turkish society in a substantial way also, caused a popular reaction in religious form (33). This reaction found its effective expression after CHP, Atatürk’s party, had to step down at the first free elections in 1950. « Small town politicians » discovered that yielding to and even provoking the religious demands of the masses was most rewarding. This process can be summarised as follows
:
Already in 1948 the Theology Seminar had reopened in Ankara and Imam-Hatip « courses » restarted in ten cities.
One of the first decisions of the new government in 1950 was to reinstate the Ezan in Arabic.
The Imam-Hatip « courses » being found « inadequate », 7-year Imam-Hatip schools were reopened in 1951 with 3 years of secondary (grade) school and 4 years of grammar (high) school. The number of these schools was to reach 20 in 1960, 70 in 1970. In 1960, girls were admitted for the first time although in Islam women cannot be prayer leaders.
For the first time in 1973, these schools were excluded from the category « vocational high schools » and their graduates were thus permitted to enter to all branches of universities. This move had, in time, was to prove to be most important because it was the beginning of the re-creation of the religious « counter-elite ».
IV - TURKEY AFTER 1980 : FROM NATION TO GOD ?
This trend found a very fertile soil after the military coup of 12 September 1980. Although the Military in Turkey are traditionally staunch Kemalists, this time the Junta strongly backed up religious circles due to various reasons.
Firstly, because of external dynamics : The US had by that time adopted a new strategy to stop communism, « The Green Belt », and the generals had no friends but the USA because of worsening human rights situation in Turkey. Secondly and more importantly, because of internal dynamics : The generals found it very handy to mobilise religion to fight against the very active leftist movement on one side, and the Kurdish separatist nationalism (also leftist) on the other (34). This process can be summarised as follows :
Art. 24 of the generals’ 1982 Constitution made religious lessons compulsory throughout high school for the first time (35).
Art. 134 of the same constitution transformed the Turkish Historical Society and the Turkish Linguistic Society (36) into official agencies to propagate the new official ideology, « The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis », definitely more Islamic than Turkish (racist nationalist) in character.
General Evren, the head of the Junta eventually become President, always recited several verses of Koran in his public speeches (he adored to preach wherever and whenever he could) to back up whatever he had to say that particular day. This was unheard of until that period.
Pamphlets containing verses of Koran or words of the Prophet (hadis) recommending obedience to public authority were dropped from military planes in Kurdish-populated areas ; they were also constantly broadcast from radio and TV channels. Hizb-Allah, a religious fundamentalist Kurdish secret organisation was backed up to fight against the PKK, the (then) Marxist Kurdish separatist organisation. Small mosques were opened in practically every state institution, and also in the GNA.
Directorate of Religious Affairs :
By the year 1990, the budget of the Directorate of Religious Affairs had grown to unprecedented dimensions. It surpassed that of many full-fledged ministries : 1,5 times larger than that of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2 times M. of Interior, 3,5 times M. of Industry & Trade, 6 times M. of Tourism, 7 times M. of Labour & Social Security.
1994 budget of the Directorate surpassed that of five ministries put together (Forestry, Labour & Social Security, Finance, Energy & Natural Resources, and Tourism). It was also larger than that of 13 important government agencies put together (such as Turkish Grand National Assembly, The Presidency of the Republic, The Constitutional Court and all the higher courts, The State Planning Organisation, etc.) (37)
Its personnel grew from 53.582 in 1983 to 84.717 in 1988 (58% increase), to reach over 90.000 in 1994.
In 1995 there were 69.523 mosques attached to the Directorate. 1.500 new mosques are now built every year, i.e. 1 every 6 hours.
The number of the (official) Koran courses increased tenfold between the years 1983-93 to reach 5000 in 1990 with 175.000 students. (In the same period the total number of hospitals was 857 and the total number of all schools was 66.000. 1 school was built every 6 days). (38)
By 1990, the Directorate started to publish fetwa books on issues ranging from eating & sex habits to banking & interest on money. (39)
The Directorate also set up a wealthy holding containing 7 corporations with businesses ranging from tourism to education and from film making to food industry. (40)
At a given moment especially mosque construction went very much out of hand and the Director publicly declared that too many mosques were already built and that people should help build schools and hospitals instead (41). In October 1997 it was also announced that, in order to stop the cacophony, the ezan should be performed from the loud speakers of only one major mosque in each city, and that in the smaller mosques this should be done by climbing to the minaret, without using the loud speakers. The prayer leaders to this day (Sept. 1998) have ignored this instruction of the Directorate. On the issue of mosque construction, it was decided in May 1998 that the written permission of the Directorate was necessary. The outcome of this measure may well be like the one taken about the Ezan.
The latest news at the time of writing of this article about the Directorate was as follows : For the year 2010 the Directorate plans to increase the number of mosques to 103.000, and the number of its personnel to 238.000. (42).
Religious Education :
23 new theology seminars were opened at the universities during the period 1980-92.
The number of the Imam-Hatip high schools rose to 581 in 1996. Most of their 500.000 students started taking government jobs (especially in the police force and the Ministry of Interior) instead of becoming a prayer leader (43).
Religious sects and orders opened student dormitories all over the country and especially in big cities, with the obligation for girls to wear the scarf and for all students to pray five times a day and to follow the sect’s rules.
Economic Situation :
As a reflection of the nationalist economic policy (Statism), Turkish official strategy in the economic field had been, since the 1930s, « import substitution » protecting the national bourgeoisie against outside competition.
This policy was radically and drastically reversed after 1980 as Turgut Özal, the Junta’s economic policy maker and a disciple of the Nakshibendi order (he was to become prime minister at the first elections in 1983 and later, President of the Republic). This champion of privatisation chose to « open Turkey to the outside world » by suddenly and radically liberalising the economy and finance through the credits and under close supervision of the IMF and the World Bank.
Turkey soon became an integral part of global economics. Foreign capital began to flow in especially in credits and also through foreign direct investments. Özal brought the value of the national currency (TL) to a realistic level, Turkish economy became more competitive, and its financial credibility as well as its reserves of foreign currency rose with the booming exports. Large Turkish holding companies proved to be really aggressive in obtaining large construction contracts abroad and began to make huge profits with the help of the Iran-Iraq war at first, and with the birth of new states in the Balkans and Central Asia later. On the other hand, the State began a sell-out privatisation programme (44).
But as interest rates rocketed under Özal’s monetary policies, banker scandals savagely destroyed small savings overnight and shook the country socially as well as economically. Unemployment rose to levels unheard of before. On the other hand, inflation began to rise inversely proportional to the ever-dropping value of the Turkish Lira (45).
As income distribution worsened everyday (46) a drastic impoverishment of the fixed-income strata soon began to go hand in hand with an unbelievable corruption in administration in particular (47), and morals in general.
In this picture another aspect of Özalist economics and politics deserves special attention : The rise of what came to be called « Islamist capital ».
The Rise of the « Islamist Capital »
This capital was not a new thing altogether. It was first heard of after 1969 when Professor Necmettin Erbakan, also a staunch Nakshibendi, made his entry in politics as the President of the Union of Chambers, traditionally the stronghold of small and medium business of Anatolia. Prof. Erbakan became the champion of the latter by advocating a nationalistic « Heavy Industrial Leap Forward » against the internationalist discourse of Istanbul big business, which advocated international economic order and entry to the European Community.
Under Özal, the « Islamic capital » and its political organisations flourished. Firstly, banks from Iran and especially Saudi Arabia were permitted to operate in Turkey, endowed with some special privileges the Turkish banks did not enjoy. They were soon to be accused of « cleansing black money » and of financing Islamist organisations.
Secondly, businessmen from small and medium Anatolian towns (48) began to rise and subsequently entered the realm of foreign trade, until then chasse gardee of the large holding companies of Istanbul (49).
These « Anatolian Tigers » as they came to be called, not only asserted an important pressure on national politics through their organisation (MÜSIAD, Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen - see also below footnote 62), but also began to finance Islamist organisations and comfortable student hostels in particular, on condition that students staying there live a true Islamic life. MÜSIAD also became the principal supporter of Professor Erbakan’s religious fundamentalist party (50), the Refah.
A very high rate of internal migration (3% in average, 4% for a big city like Istanbul, up to 13% for some cities in the Southeast) (51) also helped to make this period a perfect « laboratory medium » for religious fundamentalism to flourish. The « Pavlovian » reflex of the masses mentioned above (see footnote 33) had worked again and the impoverished masses, also violently reacting to what they perceived as Westernization (erotic material especially on TV channels), began to consider Islam as the only way for salvation, in the « other » world if not in this one. It was this atmosphere that finally made Professor Erbakan the leader of a coalition government in June 1996.
Here, it is appropriate to note that the atmosphere that made Refah’s success possible also strongly affected two very opposite sides in adopting Islamist jargon and ideology : The two centre-right parties (Motherland [ANAP] and True Path [DYP]), and the Kurdish nationalist terror organisation PKK. Especially the latter’s sharp transition to Islamist discourse was amazing, for it had always declared itself Marxist-Leninist until late 80s.
Refah’s main slogan « Just Order » proved to be very successful in the ongoing economic, social, and political chaos. Professor Erbakan defined it in his green book Just Economic Order as religious, and especially Islamic, civilisation, and impoverished masses quickly interpreted it as a regime that would bring them both economic ease and peace of mind of the « Golden Past » that never was.
Refah came as the 1st party in the last general elections (Dec. 1995) ; it obtained 21.38 % of the votes and, thanks to the unimaginable political and economical ambitions of Mrs Tansu Çiller (52), became the senior member of the coalition government until July 1997. The mayors of the two largest cities were also its members and the third largest city’s mayor is known to be very strong sympathiser.
Once in power, Refah could not possibly improve such an economic mess ; it could only simulate the Islamic order to keep its voters happy.
Therefore the Party, also spoiled by its electoral success, started to act as if it had won the majority vote in a Turkey where Kemalism was unheard of.
Bearded and turbaned sheiks of the religious sects and orders (53) were invited to break the fast of Ramadan at a banquet given to their honour at the Prime Minister Erbakan’s official residence, thereby giving them a symbolic official recognition.
On multiple occasions Refah’s various leaders made declarations such as : « Working for the Party [Refah] is identical with working for the establishment of Koranic order » ; « Saying that the origin of the mandate of power is the Nation [instead of God] is a big lie ; democracy is not an aim in itself, but a means » (R.T. Erdogan, the mayor of Istanbul) ; « Turkey should send jet bombers to save her Muslim brothers in Bosnia » ; « Muslims should not reduce their greed, grudge, and hate while waiting for Islam to come » ; « Turkey is doomed like Algeria » ; « The question now is weather Islam will come smoothly or by bloodshed » (Prof. Erbakan).
Violent street manifestations of the rank-and-file were fully supported by the words and deeds of these leaders. When a young party member beat up a woman journalist in front of TV cameras, he was quickly taken away from the scene and given a better job in another Refah municipality later. When a mayor from Refah was arrested for stating at a « Jerusalem Night » that Islam would be « injected to [the veins of] the westernised elite » and for hanging there big posters of Islamic terrorist leaders, Refah’s Minister of Justice paid him a visit at the prison.
In the mean time, the three big city mayors started, on one side to prohibit for religious reasons the sale and use of alcoholic drinks, and on the other, to give the important municipal contracts to companies reputed for being staunch political and financial supporters of Refah.
At the time of the writing of this paper, the list of human and financial resources controlled by the Islamists were impressive :
« 854 private schools, around 900 public schools, almost 5000 private courses, 124 radio channels, 41 TV channels, 5200 local newspapers and magazines, an unknown number of publishing houses, 11 finance corporations controlling 1,3 billion dollars, 7 large holding companies, over 7000 large corporations, over 2000 student dormitories, 4000 associations, 4500 foundations, an unknown number of civil servants, 40 provincial governors [vali], 89 assistant provincial governors, around 300 district governors [kaymakam], a substantial number of parliamentarians » (54).
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Now, many people in and out of Turkey interpret all these developments as Turkey going back to Islam.
Or, in terms of Table 1 :
Turkey made a transition from Phase 1 to Phase 2 by a Kemalist revolution from above without becoming a real nation-state. Now that she is « hit » by the dynamics of Phase 3 that forces her to go beyond the nation-state, Turkish society tries to find the « salvation » in making a backwards transition to Phase 1 and espouse the same CI (Islam) she had 70 years ago.
In Section V of this paper I’ll try to assess weather this interpretation of « backwards transition » is accurate for Turkey.
To be continued
ENDNOTES
17 The Sultan-Caliph had to obtain the Fetwa of the Sheik ul Islam on a matter involving the Islamic order (Shariah) and the latter included almost any worldly matter as Islam governed temporal as well as spiritual realms. However, the Empire was far from being theocratic for two solid reasons : 1) Besides the fact that many provisions of Islamic Law were never or very seldom applied (for instance, recm -public killing of the adulterer/adulteress by throwing stones- still prevalent today in Saudi Arabia and Iran was applied only twice during 600 years and hand-cutting of thieves was unheard of), the Mecelle enacted after the Westernizing Tanzimat movement (1839) was meant to be applied to persons of all religions and confessions although it was based on Islamic Law. On the other hand, the multi-religious Ottoman society considered at large, the multi-legal system had been there since at least 1454 because of the « Millet System » ; 2) In any case, it would be very difficult to call the Empire « theocratic » because the fetwa-giver Sheik ul Islam could be dismissed by the Sultan anytime and this latter could very well have him executed by the fetwa of the new Sheik ul Islam. This came from the very fact that Ottoman Empire was, as in many other things, a carbon copy of the Byzantine Empire as far as Religion-State relations were concerned. As a matter of fact, the expression « Caesarism » meaning the supremacy of the State over Religion is a legacy of Byzantium.
18 Because, besides the fact that these insurgencies became, at a given moment, a real internecine war all over Anatolia, the all-important religious factor had entered the game on the side of the Sultan-Caliph. It was somehow easier to fight against the Greeks, « invading infidels » and old « subjects », but it was more difficult to overcome Istanbul propaganda based mainly on key-words still used today by the religious and anti communist discourse : « incestuous Bolsheviks », « lackeys of infidels », and also « free-masons » (because the Young Turks were so considered -and as a matter of fact many of them were members of Masonic lodge). It should also be remembered that the « volunteer » armies of the Sultan had « raised the Sandjak-i Sherif » (the religious green flag symbolising the opening of the Djihad, the Holy War on infidels), that Sheik ul Islam Dürrizade had issued a fetwa condemning the nationalists, and that M. Kemal himself had been condemned to death in absentia.
19 This process was the legacy of Ittihat ve Terakki (Union and Progress), Young Turks’ political party. As a matter of fact, this nationalist party to which belonged all the leaders of the young Republic including M. Kemal, started many of the Republic’s nationalist and Westernizing reforms especially after 1913, with the important exception of the abolition of the Caliphate and the declaration of the Republic.
20 This type of nationalism, born as a reaction to imperialism, had these three aims/functions : 1) Independence, 2) Modernisation (Westernization), and 3) Building of a « positive identity ». The second function can be divided into a- Political Modernisation (Nation-Building and State-Building), b- Economic Modernisation (Development through national capitalism), and c- Cultural Modernisation (Westernizing reforms). The third function was the result of the contradiction between the first (getting rid of the West) and the second (re-introduction of the West) functions. See my Kemalist Nationalism, a non-official interpretation, Ankara, Bilgi, 1988 (in Turkish).
21 This motto still figures in large characters above the chair at the GNA. On the other hand, M. Kemal no doubt profited a lot from the double meaning of « nation ». This term that had earlier meant umma (religious community) had come to mean, in the last days of the Empire, « nation » in the Western sense, its sole meaning today. Professor Erbakan, founder of several religious parties, used the same tactic exactly the other way around since 1970s.
22 This was the end of the Ottoman Empire ; on 17 November the Sultan had to escape from Istanbul on a British war vessel. This was also the separation of temporal and spiritual powers (the Sultanate and the Caliphate) and it weakened them both. The new Caliph was chosen by the GNA.
23 This was only a « reaffirmation » because the unnamed republic had been there ever since « national sovereignty » was pronounced.
24 Each of the three moves was accomplished by a law of the GNA, not by a fetwa or anything alike.
25 All that are mentioned above were deadly blows to the orthodox (official) Islam.
26 This was a blow to heterodox (popular) Islam.
27 This law reform meant a series of very important changes : Definite rupture with the Islamic law, the end of the multi-legal Ottoman system, introduction of the European secular law system based on rationalism, national sovereignty, and capitalism. The law reform’s importance came, above all, from the very fact that it was a major instrument of social transformation used by the Kemalist revolution from above (Bülent Tanör, The Foundation, Istanbul, Cumhuriyet, 1997, p.59-64 - in Turkish).
28 This was a deadly blow to the hodjas’ monopoly on reading & writing and its outcome (if not the ultimate purpose) was to sever ties with the Ottoman cultural past
29 The other « arrows » were Republicanism, Nationalism, Populism, Statism, and Reformism.
30 These two Societies were entrusted with the duty to build the all-important historical and linguistic foundations of the new Turkish Nation. The Historical Society’s purpose was to go to the Central Asian roots of the Turks, over the shoulder of the Muslim-Ottoman period. Linguistic Society’s purpose was to « purify » the language from Ottoman words. Therefore, these were key institutions par excellence of the new cohesion ideology, nationalism. (In short, this was a « Back to the Future » operation !).
31 Kemal Karpat, Türk Demokrasi Tarihi, Istanbul, 1967, p.53, footnote 67 (The original is in English : Turkey’s Politics).
32 This Kemalist revolution from above was rendered possible by mainly four factors, the first three being created by internal, and the fourth by external dynamics :
1) The nature of Islam : a) Unlike Christianity in the West, Islam had no established Clergy (Church), b) It was disunited from the very beginning (Shia and Sunna constituting what we call « orthodox » (official) religion, and a multitude of sects and orders (tarikat) as « heterodox » religion), c) Peasant masses in the Ottoman Empire had never been bigots. 2) Secularism, contrary to the general opinion, was not imported from the West (see footnote 17). 3) The Kemalists had just emerged triumphant from the war of national liberation fought in a very desperate medium against the « former subjects and infidel invaders ». 4) Kemalist revolution was made in an exceptional atmosphere of « relative autonomy of the state » to which the existence of the Soviet state also contributed : The Western powers, preoccupied with both the 1929 Depression and the Nazi-Fascist threat, were unable to turn their attention to the Anatolian Revolution and Kemalism was able to strengthen its state and build its nation. It must also be said that this Westernizing ideology of Kemalist nationalism was is no way in conflict with Western interests.
On the other hand, Kemalist revolution had two great disadvantages : 1) Due to several reasons, there had never been a separation of spiritual and temporal powers/worlds in Islam ; and 2) There was no bourgeoisie to support the revolution against feudalism.
33 This religious form came from several sources. Firstly, anti clerical measures of the nationalists were much resented in an agrarian society almost completely Muslim. Secondly, since the Ottoman Empire Westernization (Western = infidel) not only had done nothing to improve the situation of the masses, on the very contrary, it had always been hand in hand with drastic impoverishment of the masses because it had always been adopted as a last solution during periods of great difficulty. So, when the poor masses came across a measure they considered as Westernization, they had always shown a religious reaction as an almost « Pavlovian reflex ». Thirdly, these Westernizing measures coincided with the 1929 Depression. As impoverishment grew, poor masses came to consider religion as the only « salvation ».
On the other hand, it should be remembered that religious reaction is the standard popular form of protest whenever/wherever cohesion of a society is « disturbed » by modernisation. Kimbanguism (1921) and Matswanism (1930) are cases in point in Black Africa. Similarly in the Ottoman Empire, when the centralising efforts of the Sultan in the mid-19th century plunged the Kurdish population into chaos by destroying Kurdish tribal leaders’ principalities, the Kurds started in 1880 a series of uprisings using religious jargon, the last of which took place in 1925 during the Republic. This last uprising was definitely the work of the secret revolutionary organisation, called Azadi, founded by secular Kurdish officers of the Turkish army, but it nonetheless used religious arguments and was unavoidably led by a sheik, Sheik Said.
34 This policy had already been applied by Prime Minister Demirel (the president of the Republic today) against the left ever since 1970s. But what’s interesting to note is that, this was exactly the same policy that was applied in Algeria also.
35 This was a joint proposal of Employers’ Union of Turkey (TISK) and of Union of Chambers of Agriculture. The first represented the big bourgeoisie of Istanbul, the second the petit bourgeoisie of Anatolia.
36 These two institutions were until then private law persons endowed by Atatürk’s testament. The generals’ unbelievable move was to transform them into public law persons, transfer their income to the State and therefore indirectly cancel Atatürk’s testament. The fact that this was also done to enable the Turkish Bank of Affairs (« Türkiye Is Bankasi ») to increase its capital (the Bank was unable to do so because, according to the Testament, the two Associations had the usufruct of Atatürk shares and the CHP [Republican People’s Party, closed by the junta] retained their property) is another interesting point highlighting the relation between the business world and the junta. In 1992 Mr. Haluk Selçuk, the Secretary General of the Turkish Linguistic Society, confirmed that the Atatürk shares in the two associations decreased from 27.57 % (twenty seven point fifty seven Per cent) to 3 %0 (three Per thousand) (Milliyet, 01.07.1992).
37 Aydinlik, 14.12.1993.
38 Milliyet, 17.10.1995.
39 Sabah, 13.02.1997.
40 Aydinlik, 23.07.1994.
41 Milliyet, 17.10.1995.
42 Deniz Som, Cumhuriyet, 25.06.1998.
43 Cumhuriyet, 17.11.1994. A survey conducted by Gallup among the Imam-Hatip students showed that they were more pious and conservative than the average Refah voter. 80% of them asked Islamic law be included in the present law system (against 61% among Refah voters), 86% of them asked alcoholic beverages be prohibited (against 74% among Refah voters), and only 20% declared they would like to become a prayer leader. See Cumhuriyet, 1 April 1997).
44 This privatisation programme brought in, as of beginning 1998, 4,2 billion dollars while the state’s expenditure to collect this money amounted to 3,8 billion dollars (KONTROL ET, DIPNOT VER)
45 When Özal took the reins of economic policy in 1980, 1 US $ was worth 35 (thirty-five) TL. 1 US $ is now worth (end of July 1998) over 270.000 (two hundred seventy thousand) TL. Inflation rose from 22 % in 1982 to 99 % in 1997, the peak year in between being 1994 with an inflation rate of 125 %. (Figures of the State Institute of Statistics, cited in Capital Infocard, April 1998, p.1).
46 Real wages in manufacturing industry declined by 30 % between 1977 and 1988. In 1994, the per capita national income of the richest twenty per cent of the population was $ 5932, while the poorest twenty per cent received $ 530. Again in 1994, the richest twenty per cent of the population received 55 % of the disposable income in Turkey, while the poorest twenty per cent received 5 %. (ibid, p.6).
47 Bribery in administration was symbolised, enhanced, and also « legalised » by what Özal once said : « My public servant would know what to do ».
48 These towns had always been the most conservative places in Turkey, as is the case all over the world. Islam had never been strictly observed in villages but had always been very important in these small towns.
49 These Anatolian businessmen were, at the beginning of the 80s, paying commission to these holding companies to export their products but soon discovered that learning the techniques of export would be more profitable, and went into business for themselves.
50 So far, Professor Erbakan has founded (or, has been responsible of the foundation of) four religious fundamentalist political parties. The first called MNP (National Order Party) lived between 1969-71, when it was closed by the Constitutional Court. The second called MSP (National Salvation Party) lived between 1972-80 and was closed, along with other parties, by 12 September Junta. The third is the Refah (RP -Welfare Party) that lived between 1983-98 and was closed by the Constitutional Court (see below). The fourth, Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party) has been founded in 1997 right before the closure of Refah. (DIKKAT : BU PARTILERDEN BIRI BASKA TÜRLÜ KAPATILMIS OLABILIR, OLMALI) (Melek ?)
51 Caused first by Özalist economics, and second, by the undeclared war in the Southeast, this migration to big cities fortified and created in the suburbs large slum areas the big city could in no way assimilate. This ever increasing mass of underdogs that witnessed all the splendour (and, more important, all the extravagancies) of the metropolis without the tiniest hope of enjoying it, was to go in two opposite directions : First, a pool from which the Mafia and the PKK drew their militants, and second, a generator of votes for Refah.
52 It was DYP’s leader Mrs. Tansu Çiller who brought Prof. Erbakan to power by agreeing to be his coalition partner, although a few months ago she had tried to obtain the support of Western leaders by precisely playing the card of fundamentalist threat represented by Refah. A professor of economics well known in « high society » circles of Istanbul, she was educated at Istanbul Robert College and in the USA and afterwards she had made, in conjunction with her husband (who, by the way, had taken her last name when they married), an immense - and obscure- wealth both before and after entering politics. Her price was to assure Refah votes in the Parliament against the lifting of her legislative immunity in a view to investigate her wealth, and she had obtained it. In the mean time, she discovered the advantages of using Islamist jargon and she would on various occasions put on a scarf and use slogans like that of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis : « The Flag Will Not Come Down, The Ezan Will Not Stop ». She also frequently recited a prayer before making a public speech. Her financial situation is still subject of much public discussion, and investigations about her income tax declarations and the source of her wealth are still pending at the time of the writing.
53 These sects and orders had been officially closed, along with the tekkes, in November 1925. Religious outfits worn by the sheiks in this banquet were those forbidden, in the ’20s, for wear outside of worship places.
54 Report by the « Western Working Group » founded by the General Staff of the Armed Forces to study the phenomenon of Islamism in Turkey, Cumhuriyet, 21 July 1998.
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