Europe - Turkey : a matter of coherence (3)

Discussions about European identity and the accession of Turkey to the EU are frequently based on selected traits of historical and/or ideological developments. And so it is with respect to the precarious self-definition of Turkey as a nation-state, too. But both may be based on material grounds as well, which in turn may shift the arrangement of ideas about the meaning of specific historical events.
Hans-Peter Geissen offers to TE’s readers a very specific reflection on the course of the Europe-Turkey relationship throughout centuries.
In order to better understand the fate of the Ottoman Empire in a European context, and to draw some conclusions about useful steps in the near future, he draws a sketch of European history ; very coarse for the deeper past and denser for recent history.

 Hans-Peter Geissen lives in Koblenz (Germany), at the confluence of the Rhine and Moselle rivers.
Interested in all what concerns faunistics (data about animal species) of the Midrhine region, he is the author of many scientific publications on these issues. He bent on the Turkish issue with a very specific approach so as « to prevent a self-definition of Europe on the grounds of historical or religious mythologies. »

One possible option to establish political influence of the Ottoman bourgeoisy was an Ottoman egalitarianism, promoted by the « Young Ottomans » and Christian Istanbulites, and introduced, but immediately suspended with the constitution of 1876. This option was strongly supported by minor groups like the Jews and Vlachs, who couldn’t hope for an own state. It failed due to resistance of the ruler and of Islamic tradition(alists). The other possibility was the statehood of the respective ethnic communities, prepared by grammar schools. The latter came into effect in most of the Christian ethnicities or proto-ethnicities. On the Turkish side (mainly the western-type Turkish bureaucracy), the « Young Ottomans » were succeeded by the « Young Turks », they too with an ethnic-nationalist profile.

The mixed nature of the Ottoman population

The resulting conflicts became more complicated due to the fact that different religious communities were involved. In that respect the Muslims, who were considered superior to others in the Ottoman system, were religiously isolated in the context of European powers. Nonetheless, some other relations had developed in the meantime on diplomatic, cultural, and personal levels, and in form of military alliances.

Given the mixed nature of the Ottoman population, the secession of ethnic nations inevitably implied bloodshed on a large scale. Other effects were intra-ethnic struggles due to conflicts between modernists and traditionalists (like elsewhere in Europe), and the splitting of the Orthodox Church in several national churches. It turned out that there was no Ottoman nation as the speakers of Ottoman Turkish had been a rather small elite of military, administrative, and religious functionaries clearly separate even from the Turkish-speaking population, an aristocracy of sort in Western terms, which couldn’t manage to merge or ally with the upcoming bourgeoisy.

The emergence of new ethnic nation-states, which were aiming at ethnically and religiously homogenous nations which however did not exist, caused large-scale ethnic cleansing, expulsions, and forced assimilation of the respective others, starting with incipient Serbia 1804 and the Greek national uprising of 1822. A related option was and still is suppression of remaining ethnic and religious minorities. This can be observed in each and every of the emerging states of SE Europe, starting with Greece and Serbia. Similarly destructive effects resulted from the dissolution of Austria-Hungary.

Ethnic nationalism as a common feature

As a result, Turkey emerged as an ethnic nation but, at the same time, as a refuge of several Muslim populations of the Ottoman Empire, including the old Ottoman elites (Ottoman-speakers) and a large authochthonous Kurdish population. As the latter resisted to (forced) assimilation (in contrast to most refugee groups), a new conflict emerged.

A common feature of the post-Ottoman states is a fervent ethnic nationalism. Each has its myth of a « Golden Age » and an evil destroyer of those imaginary lucky times - the Byzantine Empire for the Greeks, the Serbian and Bulgarian Empires, whereas the Turks and the remaining Muslim minorities think of the Ottoman Empire as the « Golden Age » - except the Alevis, who remember Ottoman times as centuries of oppression. For most of the Christian nationalisms (but not for most of the millet elites), the Turks were the evil destroyers of ancient glory, whereas for the Muslims (and Jews) it was the betrayal of the Christian millets and/or the Western powers that actually destroyed the imagined golden times.

Neutral historians, however, can detect neither any « Golden Ages » nor notorious evildoers, but groups and persons who have pursued their respective interests and/or ideals depending on their limited knowledge about the realities.

Instead, basic deficiencies of the emerging nation-states become more and more obvious. All the new states in the Balkan region were largely devoid of administrative and diplomatic experience, as the main administrators had been Muslims. Moreover, they experienced serious economic downbreaks due to the loss of the giant market of Istanbul and due to the exile of Muslim agricultural entrepreneurs, resulting in shifts from market to subsistence economy in the countryside, which in turn affected state finances and capital accumulation negatively. The Turks in turn had virtually no financial bourgeoisy or productive entrepreneurial class left, except some market-related agriculture, mining, and handicrafts, with an overwight of military (and religious) functionaries. The Kurds had neither capital nor administrative resources, relying thus on subsistence agriculture and traditional religious and tribal leaders. The Albanian mountaineers lost the labor markets of the Ottoman Empire, not least the Ottoman army.

So all the nations suffered in several respect : direct population losses, expulsion from their former homelands, and/or economic decline. And all are still in search of a scapegoat on the « other » side, while remaining minorities are still discriminated against. There is a certain inflation in « genocides » (basically sparked off by German payments to Jewish organizations in the 1960ies ff.), which can easily be increased by Muslim groups. But obviously, this is a cul-de-sac. The decline of Anatolian Greeks was largely caused by Panhellenism and the « Megali Idea » (and this is still true for the Cyprus problem), the decline of the Ottoman Empire was largely caused by the ideology of Muslim (Sunnite) superiority, the expulsion and harassment of Ottoman Armenians by the hopeless terrorism of Armenian nationalist organizations, and so on. The only hope to understand and correct is to never forget the context and interface, and to look on the « own » side first in search for the causes.